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Abstract
Anonymity can be of great importance in distributed
agent applications such as e-commerce & auctions. This
paper proposes and analyzes a new approach for organized
anonymity of agents based on the use of pseudonyms. A
novel naming scheme is presented that can be used by agent
platforms to provide automatic anonymity for all agents on
its platform, or, alternatively, to provide anonymity on de-
mand. The paper also introduces a new technique, based on
the use of handles, that can be fully integrated in an agent
platform. Performance measures for an anonymity service
implemented for the AgentScape platform provides some in-
sight in the overhead involved.
1. Introduction
Agent technology provides state-of-the-art solutions for
distributed applications such as e-commerce, e-health, e-
government and electronic auctions [14]. The sensitive na-
ture of data in these domains makes privacy an important
requirement. Anonymity in multi agent systems can be ac-
quired by conventional methods such as the use of a medi-
ator or another outside trusted third party. A mediator or
trusted third party acts on behalf of an agent (and its owner)
and relays messages without revealing an agent’s identity.
However, such methods require explicit effort on the part
of an agent application developer. He/she not only needs to
design his/her application to relay all communication that
needs to be anonymous to a mediator, (s)he also needs to
ensure that no information regarding an agent’s identity is
leaked in the process.
This paper proposes a new approach to anonymous
agent-to-agent communication that guarantees anonymity,
(1) if required, for all agents running on a platform without
∗This paper extends preliminary work reported at
EUMAS’06 [23]
any additional effort by agent application developers, or (2)
on demand. The one main assumption is that agents trust
the middleware on which they run –the agent platform.
The link between an agent and its owner does not have
to be anonymous: the middleware is trusted and can thus be
trusted to keep this information confidential1.
Anonymity in the real world is not an absolute no-
tion, communication can be anonymous to one person or
organisation, and not to another. Similarly, agents can
communicate anonymously to other agents, or groups of
agents, but not, for example, to the agent platform on which
they run. Of the several degrees of anonymity which can
be distinguished ranging from absolute anonymity to to-
tal non-repudiation [4, 9] this paper focuses on organized
pseudonym-based semi-anonymity. Semi-anonymity is or-
ganized: when and where anonymity is provided is well-
defined. The naming scheme this paper introduces en-
sures that each agent’s true identity and its pseudonyms are
unique and cannot be linked to each other by any outside
party.
Our approach provides a dedicated and organized solu-
tion for anonymity of agents, in contrast to more general
anonymizing techniques. Most notably, Korba, Song and
Yee [11] use onion routing [6] for all inter-agent commu-
nication. Onion routing provides anonymous communica-
tion by redirecting messages via a number of routers us-
ing an unpredictable path. Implemented in the JADE agent
platform [3] a dedicated communication layer facilitates all
anonymous inter-agent communication. This onion-routing
approach can guarantee the same level of anonymity as the
approach proposed in this paper. The difference, however,
is that our approach provides a dedicated solution for agents
1In certain classes of applications agent platforms cannot accept agents
that are completely anonymous for a number of reasons. The most sim-
ple is related to malicious agents: if such agents run havoc on an agent
platform and their owners cannot be traced, an agent platform owner is
unable to take any (legal) action against the agent owner, nor can it recog-
nize future malicious agents coming from the same source. The need for
agent platforms to be able to trace agent owners, as well as other identity
management facilities [5], are assumed in this paper.
that can be fine-tuned to meet a range of agent specific set-
tings, ranging from automatic anonymous communication
between all agents, to per message anonymity.
The next section provides a more detailed explanation of
anonymity as commonly defined in Computer Science fo-
cusing on its relevance to distributed agent systems. A nam-
ing scheme for anonymity is introduced, together with the
aforementioned technique through which communication
anonymity in agent systems can be acquired. The range of
options: from complete integration in agent platform mid-
dleware, to solutions based on individual agent implemen-
tations, are discussed. The actual implementation of one
of these options, an anonymizer service, in the AgentScape
platform, illustrates the performance overhead involved.
The papers ends with discussion, conclusions and pro-
posals for future work.
2. Anonymity in agent systems
Classical anonymity in Computer Systems focuses on
anonymity of the underlying communication layer [21], as
does this paper. The typical goal is to anonymously browse
the Internet, or communicate with other parties without re-
vealing the parties true identity. The related notions of
anonymity are:
• sender anonymity
• receiver anonymity
• link anonymity (unlinkability)
The first two, sender and receiver anonymity, require that
the location of the sender and receiver, respectively, are hid-
den from the other communicating party. Link anonymity,
also known as unlinkability, ensures that the link between
the communicating parties remains anonymous to all third
parties: it is impossible for any outside party to observe
if two parties are communicating with each other. (Note
that the communicating parties themselves are often aware
of each other’s (true) identity.) In practice these forms of
anonymity can be combined.
This general notion of anonymity in Computer Science
can be applied to agent technology. The focus in this pa-
per is on anonymity of communication between individual
agents. As stated earlier the relation between agent owner
and agent is assumed to be confidential, and guaranteed by
the agent platform. Full communication anonymity, i.e., re-
ceiver, sender and link anonymity taken together, can only
be established when an agent cannot be linked to a legal
entity via its communication with other agents. A plat-
form based solution that enables the middleware to (auto-
matically) provide link anonymity and location anonymity
for each individual agent is the main focus of this paper.
Pseudonyms are introduced for this purpose.
The use of a pseudonym, however, on its own does
not suffice. If outsiders can observe agent communica-
tion, these observations can be used to obtain/deduct (un-
wanted) information about an agent. If an agent uses the
same pseudonym to communicate with several other agents,
together they can infer that they have been talking to the
same party which breaks anonymity.
In agent systems that support mobility of agents yet an-
other form of anonymity exists: migration anonymity. In
essence this hides the migration path of an agent, and thus
hides the original starting platform of an agent which results
in a form of anonymity. Migration anonymity is, however,
outside the scope of this paper, see Rafal Leszczyna and
Janusz Go´rski [13] for more detail on migration anonymity.
3. A naming scheme for anonymity
An agent platform can identify an agent by its globally
unique identifier(GUID). This GUID corresponds uniquely
to the identity of the agent. The following example illus-
trates how the use of one single pseudonym for all commu-
nication as discussed –briefly– above, does not suffice in
multi-party negotiation situations:
Example 1
There are three agents A, B and C, each with their own
pseudonym PA, PB and PC respectively. Agent A is inter-
ested in a service that both agentB orC can provide. Agent
A first uses its pseudonym PA to ask agentB about the price
of its service, then agent A uses the same pseudonym PA to
ask agent C about the price of its services. Although agent
B and agent C do not know A’s real identity, together they
can still determine that the same agent has been asking price
information of the services they provide. Thus agent A has
not been communicating anonymously.
Example 1 above clearly demonstrates the need for agents
to use more than one pseudonym to obtain (link) anonymity
- one pseudonym for each individual communication event
(or communication session). For similar reasons, agents
should also use a different pseudonym each time they com-
municate with the same party at some later point in time.
The example also illustrates that privacy protection
against buyer profiling cannot be obtained by solely using
one pseudonym. As the same pseudonym can be linked to
multiple events over a longer period of time, a buyer profile
can be constructed, and privacy cannot be guaranteed. Even
if the ‘real’ identity of the agent owner is not known!
In our approach each agent has one globally unique
identifier and multiple unique pseudonyms. The agent
platform is responsible for ensuring that all GUID’s and
pseudonyms are unique, that GUID’s are hidden from other
agents, that pseudonyms cannot be linked to each other and
that pseudonyms cannot be linked to the agent they repre-
sent.
This naming scheme is implemented using handles. A
handle is a unique and meaningless string [2] that is bound
to a specific agent.
Each agent is assumed to have a global unique identifier
(GUID) known only to the agent platform. Such a GUID can,
for example, be implemented by a Universally Unique Iden-
tifier (UUID, ISO 11578:1996). Furthermore, each agent can
acquire as many (globally unique) handles as it requires.
These handles serve as pseudonyms and are used for com-
munication purposes.
As handles have no intrinsic meaning and do not leak any
information about an agent or its owner, agents can safely
use handles as pseudonyms. Link anonymity is acquired if
agents use a new handle for each individual communication
event.
The agent platform is responsible for creation of agent
GUID’s and handles and the binding between the two. The
binding between handles and GUID’s can be acquired using
a cryptographic hash function [10]. The following algo-
rithm can be used by an agent platform to generate handles
for agents, where ‘sha’ is a cryptographic hash function:
handle1 = sha(GUID + 1)
handle2 = sha(GUID + 2)
...
or more generally stated:
handlen = sha(GUID + n) with n ∈ N+
This approach has two specific advantages:
• If the GUID is not known then handles cannot be linked
to each other or one specific GUID.
• If the GUID is known then the platform cannot deny
that a specific handle belongs to a specific GUID.
Several properties of cryptographic hashes, such as Sha-
1 andMD5 are used: First the fact that cryptographic hashes
are one way is used, i.e., easy to compute but very hard
(computably infeasible) to reverse. This guarantees that if
an agent knows a handle it cannot compute the correspond-
ing GUID. Cryptographic hashes also have the property that
they are collision free, i.e., it is computably infeasible to
construct two different GUID’s that have the same hash-
image. This ensures that all handles are unique. And cryp-
tographic hashes also have the property that a small change
in the input results in a significant change in the output
(roughly half of the bits should change). This ensures that
agents cannot determine if two handles belong to the same
GUID (agent). Because handles are uniquely coupled to the
GUID1 GUID2 GUID3
Agent Handle1 Agent Handle2
Name1 Name2 Name4 Name5
Agent Handle3 Agent Handle5
Name3
Agent Handle4
Private lookup service, only available to the middleware
Public naming service
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the handle
technique
GUID of an agent is not possible for an agent to (ab)use a
handle of another agents.
An agent platform, however, given an agent’s handle,
must be able to retrieve its GUID. A private lookup service,
as depicted in Figure 1 provides this functionality. This ser-
vice must be private to the middleware. Note, that an agent
platform can always check the integrity of its own lookup
service should it doubt the information it acquires. An agent
platforms can always reconstruct an agent’s handles given
its GUID as described above and compare it to the handle it
has been provided.
Agents can also opt to use human readable names instead
of the meaningless strings they are assigned as handles. Fig-
ure 1 depicts the mapping between human readable names
and handles, and the public naming service in which the
unique mappings between human readable names and han-
dles, are stored and from which they can be retrieved.
Figure 1 schematically displays the handle technique at
both levels. Both the public and the private lookup service
are shown, as are the possible lookups depicted by the ar-
rows.
As handles (or human readable names that are uniquely
mapped to these handles) are used for all communication
between agents, no information about the location of a par-
ticular agent is revealed to any other agent. Hence this tech-
nique also provides location anonymity and thus also sender
and receiver anonymity. Whenever two agents communi-
cate they do not have to share information on the location
(host) on which they reside.
Agents can implicitly revoke a handle (simply by no
longer using it) or explicitly (in which case the handle is
removed from the private lookup service on the platform
on which it runs). By definition, handles are also unique
over time, due to the large number of possible handles, the
same handle is never used twice. However, if so required, a
time-stamping mechanism can be used to limit the lifetime
of individual handles and hence make handles applicable
for reuse. Note that guaranteeing uniqueness of handles is
important for reliability, correctness and accountability.
4. Middleware implementation
The technique described above can be implemented in
several ways, some fully automatic, others on demand, and
all but the most fine-tuned approaches as middleware ser-
vices.
An organized solution for semi-anonymity requires
namely a solution that is integrated in the middleware of the
agent system. This provides the option for all communica-
tion between agents to be completely anonymous without
any additional effort by the agent developer.
It is, however, often not necessary or desirable to make
all communication anonymous. In fact, in many cases an
agents may wish to reveal its identity. The reasons may
vary considerably: to access information services for which
intellectual property rights play a role, to negotiate a time
slot with another agent, to collaborate with other agents to
perform a specific task. An agent may also wish to estab-
lish several (virtual) identities for different situations. Such
cases require a more fine-grained solution than fully auto-
matic anonymization.
At the level of the middleware, policies can be de-
fined that support different strategies for communication
anonymization on a per agent basis. More advanced poli-
cies, e.g. supporting self-learning or self-organizing strate-
gies for anonymization [24], can refine this further and
allow agents to be anonymous to some agents while not
anonymous to others.
A middleware anonymizing service –possibly imple-
mented by an agent– is another option. A dedicated
anonymizing service works as a sort of proxy that routes
all communication it receives, using a new handle for each
new communication session. This ‘gateway’ approach has
the obvious advantage that agent developers have more fine
tuned control of anonymity. The anonymizing service can
be used when circumstances so require. It may also be the
default option for all communication events, depending on
the policies defined, thereby integrating the service com-
plete into the middleware.
5. AgentScape
AgentScape2 is a framework for development and de-
ployment of open, large-scale distributed agent systems and
includes support for fault-tolerance, security, heterogeneity
and interoperability [16]. AgentScape’s middleware secu-
rity features include separate use of globally unique iden-
tifiers (GUID’s) and handles (of agents and services), leas-
ing of resources, sandboxing of agents, signing agent’s code
2http://www.agentscape.org
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Figure 2. Anonymizing service A facilitates
anonymous communication for agent B with
agent C. The dashed arrows represent logical
communication (between agent B and agent
C) and the solid arrows represent the real
message flow via the anonymizer (A).
and its state, and secure communication. In AgentScape
handles can be used for implementation of anonymity as
middleware services without changing existing functional-
ity.
AgentScape uses a handle-model as described above.
Each agent has its own globally unique identifier (GUID).
The GUID is generated upon creation of the agent and is
kept private to the middleware. An agent always has an ini-
tial handle that can be linked —by the middleware– to an
agent’s GUID. Optionally, a name can be assigned to an
agent’s handle. Additional handles can be requested from
the middleware. An agent’s handles and names are regis-
tered in a Name Look-up Service (NLS), that is assumed to
be private to the middleware3.
An anonymizing service is provided by the AgentScape
platform4. This service is implemented by means of a sim-
ple router, depicted in Figure 2 and illustrated in the follow-
ing example:
Example 2
There is one anonymizing service5 A and two agents B and
C in Figure 2 each with their own handlesHA,HB andHC
respectively. Additional handles are numbered sequentially,
thus HAn+1 is the nth+1 handle of anonymizer A.
3Two different lookup services can be used in AgentScape: the default
public lookup services, that is completely open and accessible and a secure,
decentralized lookup service [22] that is only accessible to the AgentScape
middleware.
4AgentScape version 0.9.0beta2 and upwards, available at http://
www.agentscape.org, contains this anonymizing service.
5The anonymizing service in AgentScape is implemented by an agent.
However as far as other agents are concerned this service is simply part
of the platform middleware. Technically this is accomplished by removing
(all) the handle(s) of the anonymizing service from publicly available name
services and publishing the handle of the anonymizing service in a yellow
page service [15].
Single Host; anonymizing disabled
# msgs # threads time avg dev
1000 1 0.123 0.063 0.058 0.059 0.067 0.074 0.025
500 2 0.065 0.065 0.066 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.001
200 5 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.001
100 10 0.060 0.061 0.068 0.062 0.066 0.063 0.003
Single Host; anonymizing enabled
# msgs # threads time avg dev overhead
1000 1 0.134 0.144 0.140 0.138 0.143 0.140 0.004 +89%
500 2 0.130 0.128 0.127 0.144 0.131 0.132 0.006 +103%
200 5 0.114 0.106 0.103 0.096 0.105 0.105 0.006 +62%
100 10 0.098 0.100 0.106 0.103 0.097 0.101 0.003 +60%
Sender and Receiver on separate hosts ; anonymizing disabled
# msgs # threads time avg dev
100 1 15.53 15.55 15.81 15.93 15.73 15.71 0.15
50 2 8.93 8.30 8.28 8.83 8.87 8.64 0.29
20 5 7.24 7.37 7.35 7.32 7.43 7.34 0.06
10 10 7.58 7.75 7.59 7.52 7.58 7.60 0.08
Sender, Receiver and Anonymizer on separate hosts; anonymizing enabled
# msgs # threads time avg dev overhead
100 1 24.71 24.86 24.65 24.70 24.79 24.74 0.07 +57%
50 2 15.97 13.92 15.35 14.98 15.97 15.24 0.76 +76%
20 5 15.83 16.16 16.31 16.14 16.03 16.10 0.16 +119%
10 10 15.24 14.66 15.89 16.94 16.26 15.80 0.79 +108%
Figure 3. Performance measurements of the
anonymizer service depicted in Figure 2
Assume that agent B wants to communicate with agent
C using the anonymizer A. To this purpose, in its mes-
sage (the Envelope), Agent B not only specifies, the ‘to’
(HC) and ‘from’ (HB) handles, but also a ‘via’ field for the
anonymizer’s handle (HA). Anonymizer A, in turn, gen-
erates a new handle HAn for this message, stripping agent
B’s handle (HB) from the message and forwarding the mes-
sage to agent C using only this new handle (HAn). If Agent
C chooses to reply to the message, agent C’s reply is sent
’to’ (HAn), ’from’ (HC) via anonymizer A. Anonymizer A
forwards the reply to agent B.
Agent B can decide when the communication session
ends. For each new session (with the same or another agent)
a new handle is generated by the anonymizer A.
The performance overhead of the anonymizer service is
largely determined by the network: If either the anonymizer
service and the sender (A and B), or the anonymizer service
and the receiver (A andC), run on the same host, the perfor-
mance overhead is reasonable (60%) as long as the number
of messaging threads is large enough (1 thread per 10 con-
current messages). If both agents and the anonymizer ser-
vice run on a different host there is a noticeable overhead
(between 57% and +119%, roughly doubling the round-trip
time of a single message send via the anonymizer), due to
the two additional messages that are sent over the network.
However, if each host runs its own middleware anonymiz-
ing service this overhead can be avoided. The performance,
in this case, is only restricted by the resources (number of
processes, memory or cpu time) of a particular host. Fig-
ure 3 shows the performed measurements and their results.
For similar reasons, the implementation scales well. As
each host can run, at negligible cost, one or more instances
of the middleware anonymizing service. In practice, this
makes the network and machine resources the main bottle-
neck for scalability.
6. Discussion
This paper introduces a new anonymizing approach for
agent systems that guarantees organized semi-anonymity
for individual agents. Such anonymous agents can be used
to ensure the privacy of users, e.g. with respect to service
providers.
The proposed technique for acquiring anonymity, based
on handles, can be completely integrated into agent plat-
form middleware as a separate middleware service, as
described for AgentScape. The maximum performance
penalty for this service is a factor of two overhead for agent
communication.
Although the approach discussed is theoretically secure,
in practice a number of risks still remain. If the number
of agents on an agent platform is known then, in theory,
it is possible that all agents conspire together against one
agent. This breaks link anonymity. A simple solution to this
problem is to use a number of ‘dummy’ agents that belong
to the agent platform itself. Other agents cannot determine
if an agent is real or belongs to the platform an thus the
attack no longer works.
Another risk, although highly unlikely due to its intrinsic
properties, is the use of side channel attacks [12]. Timing
attacks, as discussed in [17], form a particular challenging
problem. Using a combination of techniques that observe
timing behavior together with statistical analysis almost cer-
tainly breaks anonymity.
7. Future Work
Anonymous agents are particularly useful when de-
ployed in open environments. However, in cases where
agents need to authenticate themselves, e.g. to obtain access
to a service, the anonymity of individual agents, and thus
the privacy of its users, can no longer be upheld. Current re-
search focuses on the use of derived access tokens, compa-
rable to diversified keys [1], that can be used to gain access
to a services without revealing ones ‘true’ identity. Simi-
larly, (semi-)anonymous electronic payment systems [7] are
needed if privacy and anonymity are required. Integrating
such systems forms another challenge that is left for future
research.
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